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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the applications based on the
Wireless Sensor Networks are growing very fast.
The application areas include agriculture,
healthcare, military, hospitality management,
mobiles and many others. So these networks are
very important for us and the security of the
network from the various attacks is also a more
important issue in WSN application now days.
Stopping these attacks or enhancing the security
of the WSN system various intrusion detection
policies are developed till date to detect the
node/s that is/are not working normally. Out of
various detection techniques three major
categories explored in this paper are Anomaly
detection, Misuse detection and Specification-
based detection. Here in this review paper
various attacks on Wireless Sensor Networks
and existing Intrusion detection techniques are
discussed to detect the compromised node/s. The
paper also provides a brief discussion about the
characteristics of the Wireless Sensor Networks
and the classification of attacks.
Keywords - Attacks, Intrusion detection,
Intrusion detection techniques, Wireless sensor
networks (WSN)
1. INTRODUCTION
The dashing progress in communication
technologies proposes low-priced, low-power
and multifunctional devices which leverages the
idea of the sensors. The wireless sensor
networks can be defined as a kind of networks
that is formed by small sensors which are tightly
deployed in an unattended environment. This
network has no predefined infrastructure and can
work in a structured or non-structured manner.
According to [1], there are some features that
make WSNs different from other Mobile Ad-hoc
Networks (MANET). These differences include
the following;
A). The number of nodes in WSN is greater
compared to MANET
B). The great capacity of nodes in WSN
compared to MANET
C). The high chance of sensor failures in
WSN because of the deployment
circumstances
D). The need for mobility causes the
dynamic change of WSN topology
E). The high resource constraints of WSN
in terms of power, storage,
communication and processing
capability
Yick et al. [2] categorized the WSN applications
into two categories 1). Monitoring  2). Tracking.
Each category is further categorized into many
secondary categories. A large number of
monitoring and tracking systems are already
implemented and in the service to the public or
the industry. However, describing such system is
out of the scope of this survey.
To protect wireless sensor networks from the
various weaknesses, preventive mechanisms like
authentication and cryptography can be used to
fend some type of attacks that are extruders.
These type of methods or mechanisms define the
primarily line of defense for the wireless sensor
networks. However, some other type of attacks
could not be prevented by these types of
prevention mechanisms. Because these
prevention mechanisms are used to detect only
the outsider attacks not any insider attacks. So,
for the insider attacks we need some other types
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of detection mechanisms, known as intrusion
detection system [3].
2. CHARACTERISTICS OF WIRELESS
SENSOR NETWORKS
2.1 Self-Organization
Wireless sensor networks are formed by
arranging great amount of sensor nodes in a
domain. These Sensor networks protocols and
algorithms have ability of self-organizing.
2.2 Multi hop Routing
Sensor nodes use multi-hop routing to promote
their data to the upper nodes due to their short
communication.
2.3 Resource Limitation
Wireless sensor nodes do not have a large
battery life, larger transmission range and more
computational power. They have limited
memory. Although in the extent literature
researches subjected to WSN are very
generative, yet they still need to apply more
efforts in the security of WSN. The arranging
methods of WSN make them more defenseless
to various attacks. WSN are used in applications
where the sensors have physical interactions
with the environment and are accessible by
anyone makes them more vulnerable to security
threats. The limitations [4] of WSN (in memory,
energy and accessibility after deploying) make
the use of existing security techniques infeasible.
In this paper it is tried to mention the security
threats and the intrusion detection mechanisms
to protect from.
Figure1: Typical multi-hop Wireless Sensor
Network Architecture
2.4 Challenges of Wireless sensor networks
These communication limitations have been
addressed by the start of multi-hop wireless
networks, based on routing protocols from ad
hoc networks. Akyildiz et al. [1] noted In
contrast to other types of networks that this new
creation of wireless sensor networks has several
special requirements that raise novel technical
challenges,
2.4.1 Varying network size
The number of sensor nodes can vary over time
as nodes move or lose power.
2.4.2 Power constraints
In many situations the sensor nodes have a
limited power supply, which makes
communication much more expensive in
comparison to local storage and computation.
2.4.3 Geographic or data-centric routing
Rather than relying on address-based routing,
sensor nodes place greater importance on
geographic routing or content based routing,
where routing decisions can be made on the
basis of the stuffs of the message, and whether
there is span for local aggregation of
measurements.
3. SECURITY THREATS
It defines the intrusion as any set of actions that
are attempting to compromise the main
components of the security system 1) The
integrity, 2) Confidentiality or availability of a
resource. In the same work, the intruder
therefore was defined as an individual or group
of individuals who take the action in the
intrusion. The plainness of many routing
protocols for wireless sensor networks makes
them an easy target for the attacks. Wagner in
[5] classifies the routing attacks into the
following categories;
3.1 Spoofed, Altered, or Replayed Routing
Information
While sending the data, the information in
transition may be spoofed, altered, replayed, or
destroyed. Due to the short range transmission
of the sensor nodes, an attacker with high
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processing power and larger communication
range could attack several sensors
simultaneously and modify the transmitted
information.
3.2 Selective Forwarding
In this kind of attack a malicious node may
decline to forward every message it gets, acting
as black hole or it can forward some messages to
the wrong receiver and simply drop others.
3.3 Sinkhole Attacks
In the Sinkhole attack, the goal of the attacker is
to attract all the traffic. Especially, in the case of
a flooding based protocol the compromised node
may listen to requests for routes, and then reply
to the requesting node with messages containing
a bogus route with the shortest path to the
requested destination.
3.4 Sybil Attacks
In Sybil attack the malicious node presents itself
as multiple nodes. The attack of this type tries to
degrade the usage and the efficiency of the
distributed algorithms that are used. Sybil attack
can be performed against distributed storage,
routing, data aggregation, voting, fair resource
allocation, and misbehavior detection [11].
3.5 Wormholes
Wormhole attack [12] is an attack in which the
malicious node tunnels messages from one part
of the network over a link, that doesn’t exist
normally, to another part of the network. The
simplest form of the wormhole attack is to
convince two nodes that they are neighbors. This
attack would likely be used in combination with
selective forwarding or eavesdropping.
3.6 HELLO Flood Attacks
This attack is based on the use by many
protocols of broadcasting Hello messages to
announce themselves in the network. So an
attacker with higher range of transmission may
send many Hello messages to a large number of
nodes in a big area of the network. These nodes
are then convinced that the attacker is their
neighbor. Consequently the network is left in a
state of confusion.
3.7 Acknowledgement
Some wireless sensor network routing
algorithms require link layer acknowledgements.
A compromised node may exploit this by
spoofing these acknowledgements, thus
convincing the sender that a weak link is strong
or a dead sensor is alive.
3.8 Sleep deprivation attack
A particularly devastating attack is the sleep
deprivation attack, where a malicious node
forces legitimate nodes to waste their energy by
resisting the sensor nodes from going into low
power sleep mode. The goal of this attack is to
maximize the power consumption of the target
node, thereby decreasing its battery life. So, it is
also known as battery exhaustion attack.
Table 1: Security attacks in WSN
Name of the attack Characteristics
DoS attacks in different
layers [17], [18], [19]
Flooding, jamming,
misdirection
Sinkhole/Blackhole [20],
[21]
Shortest path, drop
the packets
Selective forwarding
[22], [23]
Selectively drop the
packets
The node replication
[24], [25]
Add extra node to
the network with the
same cryptographic
secrets
HELLO flood [26] Flood with HELLO
packets
Wormhole [27], [28] Offer less number of
hops and less delay
which is fake
Sybil [29], [30] A malicious node
pretends to be more
than one node
Sleep deprivation [31] forces legitimate
nodes to waste their
energy
4. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM
Intrusion detection system can provide
protection from both inside and outside
intruders. An intrusion detection system is
necessary for the wireless sensor networks
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because simple security mechanisms such as
cryptography cannot provide the better security.
For example cryptographic mechanisms provide
protection against some types of attacks from
external nodes, but it will not protect against
malicious inside nodes, which already have the
required cryptographic keys. Therefore,
intrusion detection mechanisms are necessary to
detect these malicious nodes.
Two major approaches are used for the intrusion
detection in wireless sensor networks 1)
Signature based and 2) Anomaly based intrusion
detection. In the signature based intrusion
detection attack patterns or the behavior of the
intruder is modeled (attack signature is
modeled). In this the system will raise an alarm
for an intrusion when the match is detected.
However in the anomaly based intrusion
detection the system will raise the alarm once
the behavior of the network does not match with
its normal behavior. Another intrusion detection
approach is also present known as specification
based intrusion detection. In this approach, the
normal behavior (expected behavior) of the host
is specified and consequently modeled.
4.1 Signature Based, Anomaly Based and
Specification Based IDS
Signature based intrusion detection (also known
as misuse detection) is one of the commonly
used and up till now accurate methods of
intrusion detection. Once a new attack is
launched, the attack pattern is carefully studied
and a signature is defined for it. The signature
can be a name in characters within the body of
the attack code, the targeted resources during the
attack or the way these resources are targeted
(attack pattern). This approach is very efficient
for the known attacks and produces small
number of FP alarms. However, as the main
short coming of this approach, it is not capable
of detecting novel attacks. Once the attack
pattern is slightly altered, this approach will not
detect the altered versions of the old attacks.
Thus, this approach is only efficient in detecting
previously known attacks. There is another
approach for detecting the novel and unseen
attacks that follows.
Another widely used ID method is the
anomaly detection approach [6-9]. The basic
idea behind this approach is to learn the usual
behavioral pattern of the network. Consequently
the attack is suspected once the network behaves
out of its regular way or anomaly. However,
networks' regular behavior is not similar for
different networks. The network behavior is
dependent on the date or the working conditions
in the organization where the network is
installed. The regular behavior model for the
network can be variable. Considering these
working conditions, the degree of freedom for
the problem is large. One way to solve this
problem is to make the IDS adaptable to the
network environment where it is going to be
installed. To do so, IDS will start to monitor and
record the network behavior just after its
deployment.
Assuming the recorded pattern as the
regular pattern for the network, IDS will use it
as the normal behavior of the network and will
set a baseline. Once the network pattern deviates
from this baseline pattern by more than a
threshold value, it denotes an anomaly. As it was
mentioned earlier, not every anomaly indicates
an intrusion. This is especially true in this case,
where the system is very dynamic. Thus, it is not
clear if the detected anomaly should be assumed
to be an intrusion or not. As a direct result of
this uncertainty, anomaly based IDS will
produce high FP alarms. As a remedy to this
problem there should be a pruning system to
detect FP alarms and cancel them. Keeping this
shortcoming in mind this approach has a big
benefit, that is, it is capable of detecting attacks
or new releases of the old attacks.
A recently introduced approach is the
specification based intrusion detection approach.
Some reported works emphasize only on the
signature based and anomaly based intrusion
detection approaches [8, 10-12]. However, there
are others who talk about all three of the
approaches. The specification constraint in this
approach is used for reducing the number of FP
alarms [13, 14]. Specification based is not just
applicable to the host systems but they can also
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be applied on the users as well. A genuine user
is expected to behave in a certain way, or it can
be specific that a user should behave in this
manner. This decision will improve the security
but with the expense of a less attractive user
interface. Limiting the user actions and freedom
may lead to making the application look less
appealing to some users. It is expected to get
better results by applying specification based ID
methods on the system itself.
4.2 Network Based IDS and Host Based IDS
Mukkamala et al. [15] consider that IDS has two
categories 1) Host based IDS and 2) Network
based IDS. They define these two types as
follows: “A host based IDS monitors all the
activities on a single information system host. It
ensures none of the information system security
policies are being violated. A network IDS
monitors activities on a whole network and
analyzes traffic for potential security breaches or
violations.”
The network based IDS are responsible to
protect the entire environment of the network
from the intrusion. This task asks for full
knowledge of the system status and monitoring
both the components of the network and the
transactions between them. Agent technology
plays a key role in this strategy. The host based
IDS are only installed on a single host/terminal
and are responsible for monitoring the status of
that terminal/server only.
This type of IDS is responsible for the
security of its host and will monitor the entire
network activities in that host [16]. One of the
problems with the host based IDS are the high
processing overhead that they impose on their
host. These overheads will slowdown the host
and therefore it is not welcomed. This approach
is quite popular among the researchers.
Figure 2: Taxonomy of Intrusion Detection
Systems in WSN
5. Various Types of Schemes Used to Build
Intrusion Detection System
These schemes can be classified into three main
basic categories (According to the prior
knowledge available for attack detection) 1)
Supervised learning based 2) Unsupervised
learning based and 3) Semi-supervised learning
based schemes [33].
5.1 Supervised Learning Based Schemes
Supervised learning based schemes involve any
kind of prior knowledge or training in order to
build the normal profile during the training
phase. In the testing phase, the new patterns will
be compared with the build normal profile to
detect any deviation. The rule-based intrusion
detection schemes can be considered in this
category since they are depending on a prior
knowledge in the form of predefined rules.
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5.2 Semi-Supervised Based Schemes
In this category, the training data has labeled
instances of one class which is the normal class.
5.3 Unsupervised Based Schemes
In these types of schemes, methodologies do not
require training data and instead of that some
assumptions are considered that normal behavior
is far different from the anomaly. Their problem,
if this assumption is not always true, it will
suffer from high false alarms.
6. RELATED WORK
The classification of the approaches is
categorized in four main categories;
1. Rule based intrusion detection schemes
2. Data mining and computational
intelligence based
3. Game theoretical based
4. Statistical based
6.1 Rule-Based Intrusion Detection Schemes in
WSN
Rule based intrusion detection schemes are also
known as specification based intrusion detection
schemes. In these schemes, the detection rules
are first designed by domain expert before the
starting of the detection process. Many of these
techniques follow three main phases 1) Data
acquisition phase 2) Rule application phase and
3) Intrusion detection phase [34]. In the
following sub-sections, the key important
schemes in this category are explored.
6.1.1 Decentralized IDS in WSN
Silva et al. [34] proposed the first and the most
cited rule-based intrusion detection scheme for
WSN to detect many different kinds of attacks in
different layers. In this scheme, there are three
main phases involved 1) Data acquisition phase
in which the monitor nodes are responsible of
promiscuous listening of the messages and
filtering the important information for the
analysis.2) The rule application phase, in which
the pre-defined rules are applied to the stored
data from the previous phase, if the message
analysis failed any of the rules test, a failure is
raised and the counter increased by one. 3) The
intrusion detection phase, a comparison is taken
place between the number of raised failures
produced from the rule application phase with a
predefined number of occasional failures that
may happen in the network. If the total number
of the raised failures is higher, intrusion alarm is
produced.
6.1.2 Malicious node detection in WSN
Pires et al. [35] presented a solution to identify
the possible malicious node based on the
received signal strength measured in each node.
They showed how to detect two kinds of attacks
called HELLO flood attack and the wormhole
attack in WSN by building a rule that compare
the energy of the received signal and the energy
of the same observed signal around the network.
Although, this solution was one of the first
solutions in the domain, it still restricted to those
two types of attacks. In addition, sometimes
there are other reasons rather than attacks that
may cause a change in the signal strength which
make this solution impractical.
6.1.3 An intrusion detection system for wireless
sensor network
A novel intrusion detection scheme that takes
the benefits of neighboring node information to
detect the node impersonation and resource
depletion attacks has been proposed by Onat and
Miri [36]. In this scheme each node can make a
statistical profile of its neighbor’s behavior
based on two features which are the received
power rate and the arrival packet rate. This
scheme cannot to be generalized for a typical
wireless sensor network application in which
many types of attacks evolve continuously. In
addition and similar to the scheme proposed in
[35], the building of the rules based on the
received power rate is impractical since there are
other factors that may affect this feature.
6.1.4 Towards intrusion detection in WSN
Krontiris et al. [37] introduce a lightweight
scheme for detecting selective forwarding and
blackhole attacks in WSN. The key idea of their
scheme is to make nodes monitor their
neighborhood and then communicate between
each other to decide if there is an intrusion taken
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place. The scheme is further evaluated
experimentally on a real WSN deployment.
6.1.5 Neighbor-based intrusion detection for
WSN
Stetsko et al. [38] present an intrusion detection
architecture based on collaboration between
neighbors. They evaluated their scheme for
detecting three types of attacks: Hello flood,
selective forwarding and jamming attacks. Their
scheme was implemented for Collaboration Tree
Protocol (CTP) on the TinyOS environment.
Although, the collaboration among nodes makes
this scheme strong, the communication overhead
is a problem. In addition, the extracted features
that are used to construct the rules like packet
sending rate and packet dropping rate caused a
high false alarm for detecting attacks. Another
drawback of this study is that it did not consider
the power consumption rate related to the
performance which is a very critical issue in
WSNs.
6.1.6 A new collaborative approach for IDS on
WSN:
Recently, a collaborative IDS scheme has been
proposed by Lemos et al. [39] to detect node
repetition attacks. This scheme is based on
determining some nodes to be monitored nodes
for monitoring the behavior of other nodes in the
network based on satisfying set of predefined
rules suitable for a specific attack type. These
monitor nodes are in turn monitored by special
nodes called supervisor nodes which are
responsible for correlating the evidences resulted
by monitor nodes.
6.1.7 Intrusion Detection based on Traffic
Analysis and Fuzzy Inference System in
WSN:
Ponomarchuk and Seo [40] introduced an
intrusion detection scheme for WSN by utilizing
two main traffic features: the packet reception
rate and the packet inter-arrival time in a time
window and then apply the fuzzy inference to
decide whether an attack has taken place or not.
However, this scheme is based on fuzzy logic,
so it needs the rules to be prepared prior the
detection process. The dependence on the prior
knowledge which is the rules makes such
schemes impractical for a continuous streaming
environment like WSN. In addition, the authors
did not specify certain attacks to be detected by
this scheme.
6.1.8 Advantages of Rule-based intrusion
detection schemes for WSN:
A). Fast detection: because there is no
training involved in these schemes. This
feature fulfills the need for online
detection when there is a continuous
streaming of data in some WSN
applications.
B). The computational complexity is not
discussed here: since the schemes use
only simple rules for detecting attacks.
C). Higher detection accuracy: since it
depends on comparison with some
predefined rules.
6.1.9 Shortcomings of Rule-based intrusion
detection schemes for WSN
A). Detection generality: since these
schemes depend on the rules prepared
by experts for specific attack types, it
cannot be generalized to detect other
types of attacks because different attacks
have different symptoms (features) that
will derive different rules
B). Collaborative voting: most of the
schemes based on collaboration between
the neighbors that vote to decide about
the occurrence of an attack. This voting
mechanism may increase the
communication overhead
C). Assumptions: most of the schemes put
many assumptions prior to the building
of their detection agent. These
assumptions make their applicability
difficult for different applications.
6.2 Clustering-Based Intrusion Detection for
Routing Attacks in WSN
Loo et al. [41] propose a data mining-based
intrusion detection scheme for WSN. In this
scheme, each node uses the fixed width
clustering algorithm to build the normal profile
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from the node traffic behavior. This normal
profile is used later to detect abnormal activities
caused by attacks. The scheme is composed of
three main stages: feature selection stage in
which the most important features that
characterize the network traffic have been
selected; cluster formulation, by applying the
Euclidean distance metric to measure the
similarities between the data traffic points and
then form the clusters; and the cluster labeling
stage, in which the result clusters are labeled
based on the assumption that the number of
objects in the normal cluster is much more than
that number in the anomalous one.
The authors [41] claimed that, this scheme
has many advantages including, the ability of
detecting unknown attacks since it is
unsupervised. In addition, the number of
features used to build the normal profile is
suitable to make this scheme generic for
detecting different types of attacks. Moreover,
the fixed width clustering algorithm reduces the
number of parameters required for clustering
and requires only one pass through the traffic
samples.  However, this scheme has many
drawbacks that make it unsuitable for the
resource constrained WSN. The most important
drawback is that, each node has to perform its
own IDS independently, so this will consume
the nodes’ power quicker because of the
clustering algorithm. Another drawback is that,
the fixed distance threshold of the fixed width
clustering algorithm makes this scheme
inflexible.
6.2.1 Detecting selective forwarding attacks in
WSNs using SVM
Kaplantzis et al. [42] propose a centralized IDS
scheme to detect selective forwarding and
blackhole attacks based on one class Support
Vector Machines (SVM) and sliding windows.
This scheme uses only 2D feature vector which
are bandwidth and count hope for the
classification. This scheme is totally centralized
in such that feature selection, processing and
decision making are all done by the base station.
The authors argue that this scheme is energy
efficient because it is entirely centralized and
there is no involvement of the sensor nodes in
the detection process. On the other hand, the
small number of features makes this scheme
very specific and cannot be generalized for
different kinds of attacks. Although the use of
Machine learning techniques provides the
scheme with the generality by training the
normal profile, this scheme only designed to
detect two types of attacks. That means the
choosing of the features is very important in
making the scheme general to different types of
attacks.
6.2.2 An Integrated Intrusion Detection System
for Cluster-based WSNs
Wang et al. [43] proposed an Integrated
Intrusion Detection System (IIDS) scheme for
cluster based WSN. This scheme is composed of
three level IDS components called Misuse IDS
deployed with the common sensor nodes, Hybrid
Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) employed in
the cluster heads and Intelligent Hybrid
Intrusion Detection System (IHIDS) employed
in the sink node. This composition of the IDS
components is according to the different
capabilities and probabilities that these entities
may suffer from. The proposed IIDS consists of
both misuse and anomaly detection modules to
get the benefits of both approaches in increasing
the detection accuracy and lowering the false
alarms.
6.2.3 Advantages of DM/CI based IDS schemes
in WSNs
A). Less communication overhead: since
most of schemes are based on the
hierarchical structure of the WSN, so
there is less communication overhead.
B). Generality is guaranteed: since the
normal profile is not based on specific
traffic features
C). Scalability is also guaranteed: because
the normal profile depends on the data
and not on the architecture
6.2.3 Shortcomings of DM/CI based IDS
schemes in WSNs
A). Slow detection: because the data mining
techniques like clustering require
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learning the normal profile, they are
slow and therefore are not satisfying the
streaming feature of the WSN that
requires a fast solution or real time
solution
B). High computational complexity:
because they involve the use of some
complex machine learning algorithms or
some difficult clustering approaches
C). High false alarms: because they build
the normal profile for a data in a specific
point of time and there is no quick
update, the normal profile could be out
of data.
6.3 Intrusion detection in sensor network: a non
cooperative game approach
Agah et al. [44] proposed a non-cooperative
game framework for the defense of nodes in
WSN. In this framework, three different
schemes have been applied to finding the most
vulnerable node in WSN and protect it. The first
scheme, an attack-defense problem is
approached as two players, non zero, non-
cooperative game between the attacker and the
sensor network. The second scheme uses the
Markov Decision Process (MDP) to find the
most vulnerable sensor node whereas the third
scheme applies node’s traffic as an intuitive
metric to use it as an indicator for protecting the
node.
The authors [44] claimed that the
evaluation of their schemes reveals its
effectiveness of successful defense against
attacks. This study needs an experimental
investigation to prove the concepts of the three
used schemes. Another limitation of this work is
that, the strategy on when the MDP should be
applied and when the theoretic game framework
should be used to gain high success detection is
not determined.
6.3.1 Game theory model for selective forward
attacks in WSN
A framework using Zero-Sum game approach
and selective node acknowledgements in the
forward data path is proposed by Reddy and
Srivathsan [45] to detect selective forwarding
attacks in WSN. The authors provide
mathematical foundations for detecting
malicious nodes using selected points in the
forward data path. They proved that selective
acknowledgements are very useful to detect the
malicious nodes through simulations. However,
like other game theoretical approaches, this
framework need to be more investigated
experimentally to prove its concept.
6.3.2 Advantages of game theory based IDS
schemes in WSN
A). The game theoretical based IDS
schemes do not need extra data to build
the model and rather benefits from the
routing information of the network.
B). The techniques used in these kinds of
schemes are lightweight since no
training is involved and are depending
on some strategies
6.3.3 Shortcomings of game theory based IDS
schemes in WS
A). It is obvious from the reviewed schemes
that these schemes still concepts that
need to be experimented extensively to
prove their viability
B). The scope of the game theoretical based
schemes is limited to some layers
information like the routing and
application layers information because it
builds the strategies based on some
information from the network layer and
application layers.
6.4 An Anomaly Detection Algorithm for
Detecting Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks
Phuong et al. [46] present a new scheme based
on the Cumulative Sum algorithm (CuSum) for
detecting different kinds of attacks in WSN.
This algorithm is one of the change point
detection algorithm used to detect the change of
the mean value of random sequence. In this
scheme, the CuSum algorithm is employed to
detect the changes in the number of incoming
and outgoing packets as well as the number of
collisions. A set of monitoring nodes is selected
so that each sensor node is monitored by at least
one monitor node. This scheme‘s main
drawback is that the monitor node can be a point
of failure easily since it is a normal sensor node.
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In addition, the implementation of such
algorithm in a normal monitor node is power
consuming.
6.4.1 Malicious node detection in WSN using an
Auto regression technique
A strategy based on the past/present values
generated by sensor nodes is presented by
Curiac et al. [47]. In this study, the output of
each sensor at each moment with its estimated
value is computed to a predictor based on Auto
Regression (AR) technique. If there is a big
difference between the two values in any sensor
then this sensor becomes suspicious and an
action should be done to mitigate its effects. The
authors presented a case study to prove the
effectiveness of their concept with some
assumptions that are set prior the design of the
AR technique. These assumptions are common
in other intrusion detection schemes for WSN
but limit the applications of these schemes for
different WSN applications.
6.4.2 Advantages of statistical based IDS
schemes in WSN
The statistical based schemes are mathematically
proven and can be used effectively only if the
accurate probability distribution model for
normal or abnormal traffic is obtained.
6.4.3 Shortcomings of statistical based IDS
schemes in WSN
A). Usually the process of acquiring the
correct probability distribution is not
easy especially when no prior
knowledge is available about sensor
streaming data.
B). Many of statistical schemes do not fit
well with the multivariate data.
C). The dynamic streaming of network data
makes it difficult to keep the probability
distribution model up to date.
7. IMPORTANT FUTURE RESEARCH
AREAS
In order to satisfy the requirements of an ideal
intrusion detection scheme, some important
research opportunities open for further research:
7.1 Detection Generality
To design intrusion detection schemes that can
be used to detect different types of attacks.
7.2 Detection Speed
There is a need for a fast intrusion detection
scheme that satisfy the dynamic and Continuous
streaming of data in WSNs
7.3 Global Detection
In the cluster based intrusion detection systems,
the clusters should co-operate with each other so
that they can form a global intrusion detection
system.
8. CONCLUSION
As the WSN becomes necessary and used
frequently for many applications, the need for
securing them is also increasing due to the
nature of their deployment and their resource
restrictions. Cryptographic and authentication
protocols have been proposed to protect these
networks from outsider intrusions but fail to
protect them from the insider ones. Many
surveys have been published for anomaly
detection but according to the best of our
knowledge none of them tackle the problem of
intrusion detection in specific. Instead, most of
them focus on the anomaly detection in general
assuming that the intrusion is kind of anomalies.
In this article, we surveyed about the intrusion
detection schemes in WSN. The classification
includes four main categories: rule based, data
mining and computational intelligence based,
game theoretical based and statistical based. For
each category, an analysis has been carried out
for each scheme highlighting their advantages
and drawbacks. Finally, some important future
research opportunities are pointed out for the
future research.
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